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Internal promotion competitions in firms 
Jed DeVaro* 
Using a sample of skilled workers from a cross section of establishments in four metropolitan 
areas of the United States, I present evidence suggesting that promotions are determined by rela-
tive worker performance. I then estimate a structural model of promotion tournaments (treating 
as endogenous promotions, worker performance, and the wage spread from promotion) that si-
multaneously accounts for worker and firm behavior and how the interaction of these behaviors 
gives rise to promotions. The results are consistent with the predictions of tournament theory that 
employers set wage spreads to induce optimal performance levels, and that workers are motivated 
by larger spreads. 
1. Introduction 
• Since the seminal work on tournament theory by Lazear and Rosen (1981), an extensive 
theoretical literature has emerged on the subject of promotions as incentive mechanisms.1 In 
the tournament model, workers of a given rank in an organization compete for promotion to the 
next level of the job hierarchy, with the promotion (and associated wage increase) awarded to 
the worker with the highest performance. The prize is the difference in wages between the post-
promotion and pre-promotion jobs, and this is chosen by the employer to induce the optimal level 
of worker effort in the pre-promotion job. Tournament theory has important implications for the 
compensation structure of the firm and its relation to worker effort and performance. It provides 
a theory of career advancement and promotions within firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of 
the tournament model, its practical relevance as an explanation for promotions remains an open 
empirical question. Empirical tests of tournament theory have been of two main types. The first 
type focuses only on the behavior of workers (or agents), testing to see whether tournaments have 
incentive effects in that larger prizes imply higher levels of performance, usually in the context 
of sporting events rather than promotion decisions in typical firms. The second type focuses only 
on the behavior of the firm (or principal), testing to see whether compensation spreads appear to 
be structured to produce incentives in the manner predicted by tournament theory. 
In this article I diverge from both streams of previous empirical literature by considering the 
behavior of workers and firms jointly rather than in isolation. I do this in the context of greatest 
interest, namely promotion decisions in typical firms. Using a cross-sectional employer dataset 
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containing information on promotions, wage spreads from promotion, worker performance, and 
worker, firm, and job characteristics, I estimate a structural model treating performance, the wage 
spread, and promotions as endogenous variables. In contrast to the studies in the first branch of 
empirical literature that regress a measure of the agent's performance on a spread that is assumed 
to be exogenous, I treat this spread as endogenous in the performance equation, since it is chosen 
by the firm to induce the optimal worker effort choice. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
of tournament theory in which the empirical methodology accounts for the optimizing behavior 
of both workers and firms, and how these behaviors jointly determine promotion outcomes. I 
describe how the interaction of worker and firm behavior has testable implications that would be 
missed by considering only worker behavior or firm behavior individually. 
Central to tournament theory is the idea that promotions are determined by relative per-
formance. Competitions based on relative performance, with the highest performer of a given 
rank winning the promotion, arise when internal hiring policies are combined with fixed job hi-
erarchies. Throughout this article I refer to such situations as internal promotion competitions. 
Tournament theory takes the notion of an internal promotion competition and adds stronger im-
plications arising from the optimizing behavior of workers and firms, in particular that firms 
optimally set wages to create incentives. Thus, a promotion tournament is a special case of an 
internal promotion competition, with additional testable implications. 
I present two sets of empirical results in this article. In the first, I provide evidence sug-
gesting that promotions are determined by relative performance for workers in a cross section of 
establishments. In the second, I estimate a three-equation structural model, finding support for 
the stronger predictions of tournament theory. A distinguishing feature of the data is the presence 
of employer-reported worker performance ratings. Such information is rare in datasets that span 
many establishments. The performance data allow a test of the incentive effects of tournaments 
in the context of greatest interest, namely promotion decisions in conventional firms. Prendergast 
(1999) criticizes the empirical incentives literature for what he perceives as its excessive focus 
on the contracts of workers for whom objective measures of output are readily available (e.g., 
CEOs, golfers, mutual fund managers, tree cutters, windshield installers, etc.). As Prendergast 
argues, most people do not work in such jobs. Instead, most workers are evaluated on subjective 
criteria. Since the analysis in this article is based on a broad cross section of workers for whom the 
relevant output measure is a subjective performance rating, it contributes results to the empirical 
incentives literature on the types of "typical jobs" that are rarely studied. 
A common approach in empirical analyses of promotions is to study comprehensive data on 
all of the workers in a single firm, the identity of which is often undisclosed. Examples of such 
studies include Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b), Audas, Barmby, 
and Treble (2004), and DeVaro and Waldman (2005). A small number of influential studies in 
this vein, most notably those of Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, have significantly shaped the 
development of new theory on careers, as in the recent studies by Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 
2006). In addition to large sample sizes and rich sets of consistently measured variables, the 
great advantage of single-firm datasets is that there is only one set of firm-specific institutions 
and procedures operating rather than a multitude of different processes, as is the case in a cross 
section. Such single-firm studies are useful in identifying the empirical regularities that hold 
simultaneously in one environment. Their advantages notwithstanding, since case studies are 
based only on single firms, there is no way of knowing how representative the firm's behavior 
is. In addition, the single firms that are analyzed tend to be selected nonrandomly, making it 
difficult to draw general inferences about employer behavior even when pooling the results from 
multiple case studies. An alternative approach, and the one taken in this article, is to use broader 
cross sections or panels of employers. Examples of this approach include McCue (1996), DeVaro 
and Brookshire (2007), and Belzil and Boganno (2005). Empirical work based on such broader 
samples of workers in a range of firms provides important information that complements the more 
detailed case studies of individual firms. In estimating a structural model using data spanning the 
full spectrum of firm sizes and types, industries, and distinct geographic labor markets, I aim to 
shed light on how well tournament theory describes the general tendencies of employer behavior. 
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2. Background and previous literature 
• Lazear and Rosen (1981) showed that compensation schemes based on workers' ranks within 
an organization are attractive alternatives to output-contingent contracts, particularly when an 
employer cannot easily measure a worker's output. More precisely, tournaments induce the same 
efficient allocation of resources as output-contingent contracts such as piece rates and quotas, 
when the principal and agents are risk-neutral. In the model, two identical, risk-neutral workers 
in a firm compete in a low-level job for promotion to a high-level job.2 The promotion (and 
its associated higher pay) is awarded to the worker who performs the best in the low-level job 
during some observation period. The prize from winning the promotion, commonly referred to 
as the "spread," is the wage difference between the two jobs. The firm chooses the spread before 
observing worker performance, with the knowledge that workers will then choose effort levels 
accordingly. Worker performance is a function of effort and a stochastic "luck" component that is 
independent across workers, with mean zero and variance 6. Having observed the wage spread, 
the worker chooses an effort level to maximize expected utility. The resulting optimal labor supply 
condition states that the worker chooses the effort level that equates the marginal return of effort 
to its marginal cost. This optimal labor supply condition and the assumed convexity of the effort 
cost function give rise to two implications about the optimal effort level. First, effort is increasing 
in the wage spread.3 Second, effort is decreasing in 6. Intuitively, when random factors over which 
the worker has no control become more important determinants of the promotion probability, the 
marginal return to effort declines and the worker's incentives to exert effort are depressed. 
The firm's problem is to choose the wage spread to maximize expected profit, given the 
worker's labor supply condition and a participation constraint. The resulting first-order conditions 
imply that the optimal wage spread chosen by the firm is increasing in 6. Intuitively, as random 
factors matter more in dictating the probability of winning the promotion, a larger wage spread is 
required to induce the worker to exert a given amount of effort. In summary, the model has three 
main predictions: (i) worker effort is increasing in the wage spread, (ii) worker effort is decreasing 
in 0, the variance of stochastic determinants of performance, (iii) the wage spread is increasing 
in 6. 
Although virtually all of the literature on tournament theory assumes that the prizes or wage 
spreads are chosen by firms to induce optimal worker effort levels, an exception is Zabojnik and 
Bernhardt (2001). In their model, wage spreads are determined competitively via a mechanism 
similar to the promotion-signalling process described by Waldman (1984). Given an informational 
asymmetry in which the current employer knows more about an incumbent worker's ability than 
do outside employers, promotion of that worker signals to outside employers that the worker has 
high ability. Outside employers update their beliefs and bid up the wages of this worker. In my 
discussion of tournament theory I take the conventional interpretation that wage spreads are fixed 
ex ante by the employer to induce the optimal level of effort. 
Previous empirical studies of tournament theory are of two main types: those focusing on 
worker behavior and those focusing on firm behavior.4 Studies focusing on worker behavior 
ask whether tournaments have incentive effects, meaning that larger prizes imply higher levels 
of performance. These studies typically use data from sporting events (golf, bowling, tennis, 
NASCAR, etc.) rather than from the context of greatest interest, namely promotion decisions 
in conventional firms. Representative articles include Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1990b), 
2
 Most of the basic results of the two-person tournament can be generalized to the case of N contestants. See 
McLaughlin (1988) for a derivation of expressions for the optimal spread and effort levels in a tournament with N 
contestants. 
-
1
 Furthermore, changes in the level of compensation that leave the spread unchanged do not affect effort. Wage 
levels only influence worker participation, which requires a nonnegative expected wage net of effort costs. 
4
 One exception is an early classroom experiment by Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987) that found mixed support 
for the predictions of tournament theory using a sample of undergraduate paid volunteers from NYU. A more recent 
exception is the study by Levy and Vukina (2004), which focuses on the league composition effect of tournaments using 
contract production data for broiler chickens. The authors find that leagues in broiler tournaments disintegrate rapidly 
over time, interpreting this as evidence that tournament contracts offer more welfare than piece rates. 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
524 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
Becker and Huselid (1992), and Knoeber and Thurman (1994).5 In such studies, a performance 
measure is regressed on some measure of the spread, and a positive coefficient on the spread is 
interpreted as evidence that tournaments have incentive effects. The spread is always treated as 
exogenous in such regressions. Conclusions from this strand of literature generally support the 
prediction that performance is increasing in the compensation spread rather than in compensation 
levels. The recent study by Audas, Barmby, and Treble (2004) is unusual in that it uses data 
on promotions, based on the personnel records of a large British financial sector employer. The 
authors find support for the predictions of tournament theory that effort is increasing in the spread 
and decreasing in the importance of "luck." Like the other studies in this literature, this one focuses 
only on worker behavior and treats the spread as exogenous in the worker's performance equation. 
The second branch of the empirical literature focuses only on the behavior of firms (or 
principals), testing to see whether prizes appear to be structured to produce incentives in the 
manner predicted by tournament theory. Representative articles include O'Reilly, Main, and 
Crystal (1988), Main,O'Reilly, and Wade (1993), Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993), Eriksson 
(1999), and Bognanno (2001). Studies in this vein typically use firm-level data on corporate 
executives and ask whether firms choose compensation spreads to create incentives as suggested 
by tournament theory. Dependent variables in these studies are generally compensation spreads 
between levels of a job hierarchy. Two predictions of tournament theory are generally tested, 
both arising from extensions to the basic Lazear and Rosen model. The first is that wage spreads 
from promotion to a given level should be increasing in the number of workers at the next level 
down.6 The reason is that more workers create more competition, which has a negative effect 
on incentives that the principal counters by setting a larger wage spread. The second prediction, 
arising from Rosen (1986), is that the compensation structure is convex, meaning that the size of 
the wage spread increases with the level of the job.7 Rosen analyzed an elimination tournament 
with a fixed job hierarchy and multiple rounds, finding that wage spreads increase with the level 
of the job because of the diminishing option value of successive promotions. 
This second strand of literature finds mixed support for the tournament model. O'Reilly, 
Main, and Crystal (1988) found that the number of vice presidents was negatively associated 
with the compensation spread between CEOs and vice presidents. In contrast, Main, O'Reilly, 
and Wade (1993) found the opposite result in a similar regression. Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt 
(1993) used data from four organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to CEO) and found 
support for the convexity of the pay structure. Using data on Danish executives, Eriksson (1999) 
found a stable convex relation between compensation and the level of jobs in a hierarchy. He also 
found that the wage spread is increasing in the number of contestants, as found by Main, O'Reilly, 
and Wade (1993) using American data. Bognanno (2001) analyzed executives over an eight-year 
period and found that pay rises strongly with hierarchical level, that most positions are filled 
through promotions, and that the winner's prize is increasing in the number of contestants though 
decreasing in the square of the number of contestants. He interpreted the evidence as supportive 
of the tournament model but noted some conflicting findings. 
3. Data and variable definitions 
• The data for this study are from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a cross-
sectional employer telephone survey of 3,510 establishments collected between 1992 and 1995 
in four metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The respondent was the 
5
 Knoeber and Thurman (1994) use data not from sporting events but from competing producers of broiler chickens, 
with time dummies representing different payment regimes reflecting the use of tournaments. Absent a measure of the 
spread, they cannot establish that larger spreads have incentive effects. However, they show that changes in prize levels 
alone have no effect on performance. 
6
 As explained in footnote 46 of Prendergast (1999), this result relies on the distribution of the measurement errors 
being single-peaked at zero. 
7
 As noted in Gibbs (1994) and Prendergast (1999), the prediction of a convex wage structure is not unique to 
tournament theory and can also be generated by a hierarchy, as in Rosen (1982), where workers are allocated to jobs on 
the basis of comparative advantage, without incentives being relevant. 
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owner in 14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel department official 
in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%. Two-thirds of the cases come from a probability sample 
stratified by establishment size (25% 1-19 employees, 50% 20-99 employees, 25% 100 or more 
employees), drawn from regional employment directories provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. 
(SSI), primarily based on local telephone directories. The remaining third was drawn from the 
current or most recent employer reported by respondents in the corresponding MCSUI household 
survey. Screening identified a respondent who actually carried out hiring for the relevant position, 
and the survey instrument took 30-45 minutes to administer, with a response rate of 67%. Sampling 
weights were constructed to correct for the complexities of the sampling scheme and weighted 
observations are a representative sample of establishments, such as would occur if a random 
sample of employed people was drawn from each city. Holzer (1996) describes the data in more 
detail. 
Many of the survey questions ask about the most recently hired worker. The key variables 
measure whether this worker was promoted or was expected to be promoted within the next five 
years, the employer-reported subjective performance rating for this worker, the employer-reported 
subjective performance rating for the "typical" worker in that same job, the worker's wages before 
and after promotion or expected promotion, and characteristics of the worker and the job. The 
data also include firm characteristics. The two promotion variables are defined as follows: 
PRCtMOTF - P '^ a P r o m o t i ° n occurred by the survey date 
10 otherwise 
PRHMFYP - I ' '^ a P r o r n o t ' o n w a s expected to occur within five years of the survey date 
10 otherwise. 
Since the observations are a sample of recent hires, in many cases a promotion had not occurred 
by the survey date. About 8.0% of the workers had received a promotion by the survey date, and 
about 73.5% of the workers were expected to be promoted within the next five years.8 
The performance measure, P, is the employer's answer to the following question about the 
most recently hired worker's performance in the job into which he was hired: "On a scale of 0-100 
where 50 is average and 100 is the best score, how would you rate this employee's performance 
in this job?" A proxy for P0, the performance of the most recently hired worker's competitors for 
promotion is provided by the following question: "On a scale of 0-100, how would you rate the 
typical employee's performance in this job?" 
Estimating the structural tournament model requires a measure of the wage spread, S, which 
is the difference in wages between the post-promotion and pre-promotion jobs. For workers who 
have received a promotion by the survey date, this spread is defined as the difference between 
their current (post-promotion) wage and their starting wage, since this is the spread that is relevant 
for determining their performance level in the job into which they were hired. For workers who 
have not been promoted by the survey date, 5 is defined as the difference between the wage 
they are expected to receive if they get promoted and their current wage. More precisely, the 
questions pertaining to the wages of the most recently hired worker are: WQ = "What is [this 
employee's] actual starting wage/salary?" W\ = "What is his/her current wage/salary?" W2 = "If 
promoted, what would this employee's wage or salary be?" The reported time frame for these 
wages was either hourly, weekly, monthly, or annually, and I converted all responses to hourly 
wages measured in 1990 dollars, deflated using the CPI-UX. From these I defined the wage 
spread, S: 
IV,, - W0i if PROMOTE) = 1 
' ' W2i - Wu if PROMOTEj = 0. 
8
 These statistics reflect sampling weights. Missing values reduce the total MCSUI sample size of 3,510 to 3,175 
for PROMOTE and to 2,668 for PROMEXP. I further omitted 350 cases for which the employer reported that no promotion 
was possible for the job in question, resulting in sample sizes of 2,827 for PROMOTE and 2,341 for PROMEXP. The 
73.5% statistic includes both workers who have already received a promotion and those who have not. Excluding those 
who have already received a promotion, about 71.8% of workers were expected to be promoted within the next five years 
(N = 2.093). 
© RAND 2006. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
526 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
In principle, it is possible that a worker was promoted more than once since the hiring date. Since 
multiple promotions are not observable in the data, in such cases the measured wage spread would 
span more than two levels. However, since the sample is one of recent hires, with a relatively 
small fraction of observed promotions by the survey date, few workers will have had time to be 
promoted more than once. 
Controls for worker and firm characteristics include dummies for whether the most recent 
hire has more than a high school degree or a college degree or more; the worker's tenure with 
the establishment; the fraction of high-skilled workers currently employed at the establishment; 
sex; age; race; establishment size; number of sites of operation for the firm; fraction of workers 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement at the establishment; duration of the establishment's 
operation at the current site (2 years or less, more than 2 years but no more than 5, more than 
5 years); dummies for whether the establishment is a franchise, whether it is for-profit, whether 
it employs temporary workers, whether it employs contract workers, whether it has formal pro-
cedures for posting internal job openings and soliciting applications for filling them; 8 industry 
categories (manufacturing, services, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, public administration, 
construction and mining, transportation); and the following occupation categories:9 
Managerial: Includes executive, administrative, and managerial occupations. 
Scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers: Includes surveyors and architects; natural scientists and 
mathematicians; social scientists; religious workers; health diagnosing and treating practitioners. 
Teachers, librarians, counselors: Also includes writers, artists, entertainers, and athletes. 
RNs, pharmacists, and dieticians: Also includes therapists and physicians' assistants. 
Technologists and technicians: Both "health" and "nonhealth." 
Marketing and sales occupations. 
Administrative support occupations, including clerical. 
Service occupations. 
Craft, construction, and transportation occupations: Includes mechanics and repairers; extractive 
occupations; precision production occupations; material-moving occupations. 
Production workers and laborers: Includes handlers, equipment cleaners, and helpers. 
The first two columns of Table 1 display summary statistics for the full sample.10 
4. Are promotions determined by relative performance? 
• In some firms, the combination of internal hiring policies and fixed job slots creates inter-
nal promotion competitions in which promotions depend on relative performance. There are a 
number of possible theoretical rationales for internal hiring policies. One possibility is that firms 
choose internal hiring over external hiring because of informational advantages. Hiring inter-
nally saves on the recruitment and screening costs associated with external hiring. Furthermore, 
incumbent workers might have valuable firm-specific knowledge that justifies filling a position 
through internal promotion. A second explanation, proposed by Waldman (2003), argues that 
internal promotions may be understood as a rational response on the part of the firm to avoid the 
time-inconsistency problem that arises when promotions are used for both job assignment and 
incentives. A third explanation is that internal hiring policies are used to motivate workers by the 
'Technically there are 9 industry groups, since 2 of the observations are from the agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing industries. These are included in the reference group in models that include industry controls. Dropping these 2 
observations from all analyses yields virtually identical results to those I report in the article. 
10
 The sample size of 3,160 rather than 3,510 reflects the deletion of 350 cases for which the employer reported 
that no promotion was possible for the job in question. For many variables, the sample size is lower than 3,160 due to 
missing values. 
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prospect of a promotion tournament as described by Lazear and Rosen (1981). This idea is 
developed in Chan (1996), where it is argued that in the context of tournaments, internal promotion 
policies serve as handicapping mechanisms that preserve incentives for a firm's current workers. 
An alternative way to maintain incentives in the face of external hiring would be to increase the 
size of the wage spread, but this creates problems of moral hazard on the part of the employer 
and also creates problems of sabotage as described by Lazear (1989). 
Internal hiring alone, however, does not imply that relative performance determines promo-
tions. In some cases there are not fixed job hierarchies creating internal competitions for a fixed 
number of promotions. Instead, everyone can, in principle, be promoted for good performance. 
This is the model used in some consulting firms, in banks, and in research settings, where workers 
have job titles like "research associate," "senior research associate," "vice president," and "senior 
vice president," and often job tasks vary little across levels of the hierarchy. Since there is not a 
fixed number of vice president positions, the fact that one worker gets promoted to vice president 
does not adversely affect the probability that another will also be promoted. In such cases, even if 
all positions are filled with internal candidates, there are not internal competitions, and therefore 
promotions do not depend on relative performance but rather on absolute performance levels. 
Given the existence of both types of promotion processes, whether promotions based on relative 
performance occur frequently enough to be detected in the cross section is an empirical question. 
Consider the following probit models for the probability of promotions and expected pro-
motions: 
Prob(PROMOTEj = \) = <S>(ao + a, P{ + a2 P0i + Z, b) (1) 
Prob(PROMEXPj = 1) = <D(c0 + ciPi+c2 Pot + Z,d). (2) 
Here P, denotes the performance of worker / (the most recent hire) in his starting job, P0i 
denotes the performance of the typical worker in that same job, Z, is a vector of worker and 
firm characteristics, and <J> is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. If promotions 
were based solely on absolute performance in the cross section, we would expect to find positive 
estimates for aj and c\, but the estimates of a2 and c2 should be near zero. That is, increases in the 
most recently hired worker's performance should improve his chances of promotion (and expected 
promotion), but increases in the performance of his competitors (as measured by the performance 
of the typical worker in that same position) should not harm his chances. On the other hand, if 
promotions are based on relative performance, we should expect to find positive estimates for 
a\ and c\ but negative estimates for a2 and c2, since a higher level of performance for the most 
recent hire's competition implies a reduction in the most recent hire's chances for promotion or 
expected promotion. Table 2 displays results from these probit models." As seen in columns 1 
and 3, the results suggest that relative performance matters in determining both promotions and 
expected promotions. A ten-point increase in P from the mean value of 78, holding constant 
Po. is associated with an increase of about 2.6 percentage points in this worker's probability of 
promotion.12 Similarly, holding P constant, an increase from 76 to 86 in Po is associated with a 
decrease of nearly 1.3 percentage points in the promotion probability. For expected promotions, 
a ten-point increase in P is associated with an increase of nearly 4.6 percentage points in the 
probability of expected promotion, and a ten-point increase in Po is associated with about a 2.5 
percentage point decrease in the probability of expected promotion. These results are upheld 
even in the presence of controls for worker and firm characteristics. The same pattern of signs 
(positive on performance and negative on typical performance) is observed for both promotions 
Missing values scattered across the variables reduce the sample size to 1,516 in the probit for PROMOTE. In 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 I report summary statistics computed on this subsample, to be compared with those of the full 
sample in columns 1 and 2. For most variables, the means are roughly comparable between columns 1 and 3. The means 
are also roughly comparable for the sample of 1,357 used in the probit for PROMEXP; note that the sample size is lower 
for the PROMEXP models than for the PROMOTE models, because in the PROMEXP models I dropped those workers 
who had been promoted by the survey date. Throughout the article I estimate all models using listwise deletion. 
12
 A ten-point increase in performance is roughly half of the standard deviation of performance. 
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Promotion Variables 
PROMOTE 
PROMEXP 
Performance Variables 
Performance (P) 
Typical performance (/W 
Wage spread (S) 
Worker Characteristics 
More than high school 
College or more 
Fraction high skilled 
Tenure (in years) 
Male 
Age 
Black 
Hispanic 
Other non-white 
Firm Characteristics 
For profit 
Franchise 
Internal hiring 
Number of sites 
Establishment size 
Union (% covered in establishment) 
Temporary workers 
Contract workers 
<2 years in operation 
>2 & <5 years in operation 
>5 years in operation 
Occupational Categories 
Managerial 
Scientists, engineers, 
doctors, lawyers 
Teachers, librarians, 
counselors 
RNs, pharmacists, 
and dieticians 
Technologists and 
technicians 
Marketing and sales 
Administrative support, 
including clerical 
Service occupations 
Craft, construction, and 
transportation 
Production workers and 
laborers 
Mean 
(1) 
.080 
.735 
78.185 
75.897 
3.34 
.253 
.353 
.318 
.115 
.477 
30.486 
.176 
.144 
.083 
.759 
.062 
.611 
63.350 
554.010 
17.553 
.365 
.295 
.084 
.147 
.769 
.100 
.049 
.071 
.032 
.044 
.132 
.268 
.106 
.102 
.092 
Standard Error 
(2) 
.006 
.013 
.458 
.414 
.307 
.011 
.018 
.013 
.005 
.015 
.262 
.009 
.010 
.011 
.016 
.006 
.014 
8.391 
56.836 
1.119 
.015 
.013 
.007 
.010 
.012 
Oil 
.009 
.010 
.009 
.007 
.009 
.011 
.008 
.007 
.006 
Mean 
(3) 
.092 
.726 
78.149 
75.760 
3.42 
.268 
.315 
.308 
.123 
.474 
30.730 
.164 
.153 
.064 
.802 
.072 
.560 
69.940 
320.040 
15.905 
.320 
.263 
.088 
.151 
.761 
.099 
.052 
.081 
.029 
.043 
.139 
.268 
.087 
.102 
.096 
Standard Error 
(4) 
.009 
.018 
.625 
.549 
.405 
.016 
.023 
.015 
.008 
.020 
.303 
.012 
.016 
.009 
.018 
.009 
.020 
11.201 
63.223 
1.605 
.020 
.016 
.010 
.013 
.016 
.015 
.015 
.015 
.013 
.008 
Oil 
.016 
.008 
.009 
.008 
Mean 
(5) 
.124 
.785 
78.062 
75.757 
2.83 
.301 
.192 
.254 
.127 
.424 
29.868 
.189 
.163 
.058 
.874 
.070 
.490 
65.101 
183.143 
13.347 
.298 
.246 
.097 
.181 
.722 
-
-
-
-
.077 
.250 
.503 
-
.170 
-
Standard Error 
(6) 
.015 
.021 
.645 
.578 
.184 
.020 
.023 
.014 
.010 
.025 
.452 
.021 
.020 
.010 
.018 
.011 
.025 
11.351 
25.975 
2.015 
.022 
.020 
.019 
.017 
.023 
-
-
-
-
.015 
.021 
.025 
-
.018 
-
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TABLE 1 Continued 
Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Industry Categories 
Public administration 
Construction 
Wholesale trade 
Finance 
Retail trade 
Manufacturing 
Services 
Transportation 
umber of observations 
.014 
.027 
.078 
.078 
.152 
.205 
.390 
.053 
3,160 
.003 
.004 
Oil 
.006 
.009 
.010 
.016 
.008 
.014 
.019 
.094 
.065 
.152 
.220 
.393 
.039 
1.516 
.004 
.003 
.013 
.007 
.012 
.015 
.021 
.006 
.013 
.028 
.079 
.099 
.190 
.229 
.318 
.040 
632 
.005 
.006 
.012 
.013 
.020 
.021 
.023 
.010 
Note: Summary statistics in columns I and 2 use all available data for each variable, excluding 350 observations for which the employer 
reported that no promotion was possible for the promotion in question. These 350 observations were also omitted from columns 3-6. Due 
to missing observations scattered throughout the variables, the actual sample size for a given variable in columns I and 2 is frequently less 
than 3,160. Columns 3 and 4 compute summary statistics only for the subsample of 1,516 observations used in the first main set of empirical 
results (presented in column 2 of Table 2). Columns 5 and 6 compute summary statistics only for the subsample of 632 observations on 
"skilled" workers used in the second main set of empirical results (presented in Table 3). 
and expected promotions. This pattern of matching signs generally holds for the control variables 
as well, in that the signs of the marginal effects of the controls are usually the same between 
the promotion equation and the expected promotion equation whenever at least one of the two 
effects is statistically significant. This is true for each of the occupation and industry controls, 
even though these are unreported in Table 2. An interesting result that is new to the literature is 
that even in the presence of all the other controls, for-profit status is associated with significantly 
higher probabilities of promotion and expected promotion. This finding is explored in DeVaro 
and Brookshire (2007). 
The evidence suggesting that relative performance matters in determining promotions does 
not rule out the possibility that absolute performance also matters. Rather, it is evidence that 
absolute performance is not all that matters. This is important because most of the literature on 
promotions as job assignment mechanisms, whether based on symmetric or asymmetric learning 
on the part of the employer, has the implication that only absolute performance matters. In other 
words, in such models the performance of one's co-workers does not affect one's probability of 
promotion, since promotions are determined only by the worker's absolute level of performance 
as it increases over time or is revealed to the employer over time. In contrast, the evidence here 
suggests a role for relative performance. 
A potential limitation of the analysis is suggested by the subjective nature of the performance 
ratings and the fact that a different rater reports these measures for each observation. The fact that 
the ratings are subjective measures of performance means that they are subject to measurement 
error in the sense that they are noisy measures of true performance. Since a different respondent 
provides these ratings for each establishment in the sample, the possibility of a "respondent-
specific effect" in the performance ratings arises. For example, optimistic managers might report 
higher-than-true ratings for both the most recent hire and the typical worker, whereas more 
critical managers might report lower-than-true assessments. It might be expected that errors in the 
performance ratings are more severe for P than for PQ. The reason is that in many cases the most 
recent hire has had a relatively short tenure with the firm, and this short observation period implies 
that the employer's assessment of performance is likely to be imperfect. In contrast, the employer 
is likely to have much more accurate information on the typical worker's performance in that same 
position, since in many cases these "typical" workers have occupied the position for a long period. 
The implications of such errors in the performance ratings (due either to imperfect information 
on the part of the employer or to "respondent-specific effects") for the analysis are explored in 
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TABLE 2 Probabilities of Promotion and Expected 
Promotion 
Dependent Variable 
Performance (P) 
Typical performance (Po) 
Worker characteristics 
More than high school 
College or more 
Fraction high skilled 
Tenure (in years) 
Male 
Age (in years) 
Black 
Hispanic 
Other non-white 
Firm characteristics 
For profit 
Franchise 
Number of sites (1000s) 
Establishment size (1000s) 
Union (fraction of workers covered) 
Temporary workers 
Contract workers 
Internal hiring 
<2 years in operation 
>2 & <5 years in operation 
Occupation controls 
Industry controls 
N 
Pseudo R2 
PROMOTE 
.263" 
(.057) 
- . 1 2 6 " 
(.056) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
NO 
NO 
2,425 
.025 
.194" 
(.045) 
-.069" 
(.041) 
.007 
(.012) 
- . 0 4 8 " 
(019) 
-.005 
(.023) 
.148" 
(.033) 
.015 
(.012) 
-.0004 
(.0006) 
.027* 
(.015) 
.014 
(015) 
.050" 
(.021) 
.048" 
(019) 
-.0004 
(.021) 
.002 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.006) 
- . 0 3 9 " 
(.017) 
.007 
(.011) 
.007 
(.012) 
- . 0 3 3 " 
(.011) 
-.004 
(.017) 
.007 
(.015) 
YES 
YES 
1316 
.194 
PROMEXP 
.458" 
(.096) 
- . 2 5 1 " 
(.116) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
NO 
NO 
2,174 
.017 
.542" 
(.103) 
- . 2 6 3 " 
(.127) 
-.022 
(.035) 
.001 
(.047) 
.054 
(.064) 
- . 6 7 2 " 
(.125) 
.036 
(.035) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.001 
(.039) 
.067 
(.046) 
.099" 
(.063) 
.086" 
(.050) 
-.043 
(.063) 
.133 
(.083) 
.046 
(.035) 
- . 1 6 4 " 
(.062) 
.057 
(.037) 
.026 
(.037) 
.099" 
(.034) 
.047 
(.053) 
.011 
(.041) 
YES 
YES 
1357 
.149 
Note: Reported coefficients are probability derivatives (dF/dX) evaluated at the means. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * and " denote statistical significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. Probits for expected promotions include only those workers who had 
not received a promotion by the survey date. 
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Section 7, where I extend the structural model of promotion tournaments to incorporate reporting 
errors in the performance ratings. 
5. A structural model of promotion tournaments 
• The structural tournament model addresses the following testable propositions from Lazear 
and Rosen (1981). 
Testable Proposition 1. Worker effort is increasing in the wage spread from promotion. 
Testable Proposition 2. Effort is decreasing in 9, the variance of the stochastic component of 
performance. 
Testable Proposition 3. The wage spread is increasing in 9. 
Testable Proposition 4. Promotions are determined by relative performance. 
The first three testable propositions are implications of the tournament model, and the fourth 
is a key underlying assumption. 
Beginning with worker behavior, consider the first-order condition characterizing the work-
er's optimal labor supply, in which effort is a function of the wage spread. Substituting a linear 
approximation of optimal effort into the production function yields the worker's linearized optimal 
performance function, expressed as follows: 
P / = a o + a i 5 ; + X/«2 + ei/, (3) 
where P, is worker performance, S* = (WH - WL) is the wage spread that the worker receives 
if promoted from the low-level job paying VVL to the high-level job paying WH, X, is a vector of 
worker characteristics, and e1( is a mean-zero disturbance representing the unobserved determi-
nants of performance. This equation is the basis for the strand of empirical literature that focuses 
on the behavior of agents and asks whether tournaments have incentive effects (meaning c*i > 0). 
The articles in this literature estimate regressions of the form (3), treating S* as exogenous. Re-
call from Testable Proposition 3 that the optimal level of effort (and therefore performance) is 
increasing in 9. Since 9 is unobserved to the econometrician, it is part of £i. 
Turning next to the firm's behavior, the optimal wage spread can be expected to vary with firm 
characteristics. Furthermore, anything observed by the employer that affects worker performance 
also affects the employer's choice of the spread, since the firm chooses the spread to induce the 
optimal level of performance. That is, anything that appears on the right-hand side of (3) and 
is observed by the employer also determines the employer's choice of wage spread, whether 
or not the econometrician observes these variables. A linearized version of the firm's optimal 
wage-spread equation can thus be expressed as follows: 
S;=A, + F,/»,+X,ft+£2, (4) 
where F, is a vector of firm characteristics, X, is the vector of worker characteristics appearing in 
(3), and e^ is a mean-zero disturbance representing unobserved determinants of the wage spread. 
Recall from Testable Proposition 2 that the optimal spread is an increasing function of 9. Since 9 
is unobserved to the econometrician, it is part of Ej-
Testable Proposition 1 implies that a\ in (3) should be positive. If the performance equation 
is estimated by OLS, as it has been in the previous literature based mostly on data from sporting 
events, a behavioral interpretation cannot be attached to ct\. We cannot say that c*i measures the 
amount by which worker performance increases in response to an increase in the spread unless 
we assume that cov(ei, e2), which I denote on, equals zero. This assumption is clearly untenable, 
since both ei and £2 include common components such as 9. The tournament model predicts that 
performance is decreasing in 9 and that the wage spread is increasing in 9. More generally, factors 
that depress incentives cause the employer to increase the wage spread to counter the depressed 
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incentives. Therefore, CT12 < 0, and consistent estimation of c*i requires a simultaneous-equations 
estimation approach. Furthermore, since ai2 is an estimable parameter in the covariance matrix 
of the disturbances across equations, we can jointly address the Testable Propositions 2 and 3. 
Together, they imply o\2 < 0. To see this, note that the structural disturbances may be decomposed 
as follows: Eu = T0, +£*,- and £2/ = <p0j +£3/ • where 0, is the variance of the stochastic component 
of worker I'S performance, r and (p are parameters, and £*, and ej(- are disturbances that are 
assumed uncorrected with 0,. Hence, o\2 = cov(£1(, £2l) = r^>Var(0,) + cov(£J';, E^ ) . The optimal 
labor supply condition implies r < 0, and the employer's optimal wage-spread equation implies 
(p > 0, so the term r^>Var(0,) is negative. Furthermore,cov(e*;, e^) should also be negative, since 
factors that depress worker effort and thereby performance also induce the employer, other things 
equal, to increase the wage spread to compensate. To the extent that the structural disturbances 
include such factors, the prediction that o\2 < 0 is strengthened. 
It remains to show how the optimizing behaviors of workers and firms, represented by 
equations (3) and (4), interact to produce promotions. Consider a latent index, /*, that can be 
interpreted as the amount by which the most recently hired worker's performance exceeds T*, 
the minimum performance threshold for promotion. That is, /,* = P, - T*. The performance 
threshold depends on firm and worker characteristics and on the performance of the other workers 
competing with the most recently hired worker for the promotion. A linear specification of this 
threshold is as follows: 
T* = yo + F, y\ +XiYi + K3 Pot + en, (5) 
where F, and X, are as previously defined, Po; is the performance of the competition, and £3/ is 
a mean-zero disturbance. Testable Proposition 4 implies that y3 is positive, since the higher the 
level of Poi, the higher the threshold and the lower the probability of promotion. This simply says 
that promotions are determined by relative performance. 
A potential concern arising when the MCSUI data are used to estimate this model is measure-
ment error in the wage spread. The relevant theoretical notion of the wage spread is the expected 
difference in the present discounted values of total compensation between the two positions, 
including such nonpecuniary factors as fringe benefits and the prestige of the higher-level job. 
The measured wage spread, 5, captures only the straight wage differential (either the observed 
differential in the case of promoted workers or the expected differential in the case of nonpro-
moted workers). This measure could be afflicted by reporting errors and in any event does not 
reflect the potential influence of nonwage variables and the prospect for future wage increases 
beyond the immediate promotion. Since measurement error in the spread could potentially bias 
the parameters of interest, I explicitly account for it in estimation, assuming that such errors take 
the classical linear form. That is, 5, = S* + 77,, where S, denotes the observed spread, S* is the 
true, unobserved spread, and 77, is a disturbance that is uncorrected with £|,, £2,, and £3,. 
The reduced form of the structural model is as follows: 
(6a) 
(6b) 
(6c) 
vi (6d) 
(6e) 
where coo = a0 +c*i/3o, «i = «i0i, «2 = ct\f}2 + ct2, A.0 = ot0 + ai/30 - yo. *i = °tiP\ - Y\> 
*-2=ot\P2+«2-y2,^3 = -Y3,vu = eu+a\s2i ,v2i =s2i,v3i = £2, + /?,, and v, = eu+a\E2i-e3i. 
I assume that (£1,, £2,, t]i, v,) is i.i.d. multivariate normal with mean vector zero and covari-
ance matrix E. The identifying restrictions required on E are avv = 1 and o^ = a2n = avri = 0. 
Note that the rank conditions for identification hold unless all elements of /?i are equal to zero. 
Therefore, the exclusion of firm characteristics from (3) identifies the performance equation. This 
identifying assumption can be justified on the grounds that employers know more about the firm 
© RAND 2006. 
Pi = a>o + F/wi + X,&>2 + V|,-
s; = A>+F/0i+x,fc + va 
5,=A) + F;/Si+X,/J2 + V3, 
/,* = Ao + FA, + X,X2 +1-3 Poi + 
1 if /.* > 0 
PROMOTEi = .
 n 
1
 0 otherwise, 
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than do recently hired workers, so workers are less able to assimilate information about firm 
characteristics into a decision function than firms are able to about worker characteristics. This is 
especially so given that the typical recently hired worker has experience with only a small number 
of previous employers, if any at all, whereas the firm represents a wealth of historical information 
about how certain worker types perform in given positions. It is clear from the reduced form that 
the three parameters of interest (namely a\, ol2, and y3) are identified. That is, ct\ is inferred from 
«i =a\P\,a\2 is inferred from cov(v,, v2) = o\2 +a|Var(v2),and y3 = -k-j. 
Let g denote the joint density function and G the cumulative distribution function.13 There 
are two branches to the likelihood function, one for workers who have been promoted and one 
for workers who have not. Defining Kt = A.0 + F,Xi +X,A.2 + A.3/Jo,, we can write the first of these 
terms, denoted gi,, as follows: 
gu = g(Pi, Si | PROMOTE, = 1) x Prob(PROMOTEj = 1) 
= g(Pi,Si | /,* >0)xProb(/,* >0) 
/
oo /»oo 
/ g(ei i ,£2i .»?i . Vj)dVide2i x J 
oo . / -A: , 
/
OO /»O0 
g(E\i,e2i)g(m) I g(v-, | eu,E2j)dvid£2i x J 
•oo J-K, 
= / g(eu, £2i)g(rii)<S> ( ' M J de2i x J, 
where J, the Jacobian of transformation from (ei,, £2/, fy, Vj) to (/>,, 5*, 5,, /,*), is 1, <t> is the 
standard normal cdf, and [i and a are the mean and standard deviation of the conditional distri-
bution of v, given £|, and e2,. The second of these terms, denoted go/, is defined similarly. The 
likelihood function, L, is as follows: 
=^n w, PROMOTE, to, (I -PROMOTE;) S\i go, 
1 = 1 
where wt is a sampling weight such that £ w, = N. 
6. Estimating the structural tournament model 
• Ideally, the tournament model would be tested within a single, narrowly defined, high-
skilled occupational group. The rationale for choosing a high-skilled occupation is that promotion 
tournaments are more likely to occur in higher-skilled jobs, such as in management, than in low-
skilled jobs. The reason is that output is typically easier to measure when the work is less skilled, 
making output-based incentive schemes like piece rates relatively more attractive. Tournaments, 
on the other hand, induce effort with only the requirement that relative output be measurable 
and become more attractive as incentive mechanisms in skilled positions where output is often 
harder to measure. The MSCUI dataset is not large enough to estimate the structural model 
on a single narrowly defined occupation. My strategy is therefore to use the 1980 Standard 
Occupational Classification for the job into which the most recent worker was hired to construct 
a coarser occupational aggregate that is roughly homogeneous with respect to skill level but 
also large enough to estimate the model convincingly. I first discard some occupations that are 
clearly less skilled than the others. These include service occupations, operators, fabricators, 
laborers, and workers in farming, forestry, fishing, and hunting occupations.14 The remaining 
'• To avoid a proliferation of notation in deriving the likelihood function, I use g and G genetically to denote 
densities and cumulative distribution functions. 
14
 The average hourly starting wage for these excluded jobs is $6.73, whereas for the remaining observations it is 
$10.47. 
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usable observations, after accounting for missing values and cases for which no promotion is 
reported to be possible, include a small number (N = 170) of professional jobs (administrative, 
engineering, scientific, teaching, and related occupations, including creative artists) and a larger 
number (A7 = 632) of positions I refer to as "skilled." The average hourly starting wage is $14.21 
for professionals and only $8.61 for "skilled" workers. Given that these two groups are clearly 
quite different in their pay and skill levels, rather than pooling these disparate sets of jobs I estimate 
the model only on the larger subsample of 632 skilled workers. This group is defined as follows: 
Skilled workers: Technical, clerical, sales, and related occupations; precision production, craft, 
and repair. 
While this group is clearly less skilled than the professional workers, it is interesting to study 
in that it effectively poses a greater challenge to the tournament model if in fact the prevalence 
of tournaments is higher the greater the skill level of the job.15 Since the occupational subgroup 
I analyze is still relatively broad, to mitigate concerns about heterogeneity within this group I 
include controls for the following occupational subgroups: 
(i) Technologists and technicians: Both "health" and "nonhealth." 
(ii) Marketing and sales occupations. 
(iii) Administrative support occupations, including clerical. 
(iv) Craft, construction, and transportation occupations: Includes mechanics and repairers; 
construction and extractive occupations; precision production occupations; transportation and 
material-moving occupations. 
Summary statistics for the subsample of skilled workers are displayed in columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 1, and estimates of the structural parameters are reported in Table 3.'6 In such models there is 
no unique or universally reported measure of goodness of fit. One simple approach for assessing 
fit is to compare the average predicted values of performance, the spread, and promotions to 
their average sample values. The average predicted values are (.745, .294, .138) and the average 
sample values are (.777, .267, .131).17 Among promotions, 82 out of 632 are misclassified by 
the structural model, which is slightly less than 13%.18 An alternative approach to assessing fit is 
based on a pseudo-/?2, defined as 1 - L, where L is the ratio of the unrestricted to the restricted log-
likelihood functions evaluated at the maximum-likelihood estimates. This measure was suggested 
by McFadden (1974) for the case of the logit model. To compute this statistic, one must decide 
on a restricted model to use as the benchmark. In the case of the probit or logit, the benchmark 
15
 In fact, this model cannot even be estimated on the smaller group of professional workers without imposing 
further restrictions. In DeVaro (2006) I estimate a pared-down version of the model using only the sample of professional 
workers, finding empirical support for the model's predictions on ori and y$ but not o\i. The model in DeVaro differs in 
two key respects (both driven by the small sample size for professionals) from the one estimated here. First, the set of 
controls was less extensive. Second, the model does not allow for measurement error in the spread. For these reasons, the 
results on professionals are not directly comparable to those I present here. 
16
 The summary statistics in columns 5 and 6 are based only on observations that are nonmissing for every variable 
included in the structural model. I also computed means that include nonmissing observations for a particular variable 
even if the same observation is missing for another variable in the structural model and found that these were roughly 
comparable to those I report in Table 1. Note that some of the control variables (race, whether the establishment is a 
franchise, whether the establishment employs temporary or contract workers, establishment age) had estimated effects 
near zero and large standard errors and could be excluded from the model on the basis of likelihood ratio tests. I dropped 
these to increase precision on the remaining estimates. I also aggregated the industry controls slightly (to 5 categories) 
compared with the analysis of Section 4 that used 8 industry categories. 
17
 Note that I have scaled performance by dividing by 100 and the spread by dividing by 10. Also, the actual 
and predicted averages reported here are unweighted, which explains why the actual averages differ slightly from those 
displayed in column 5 of Table 1. The structural results in Table 3 are based on weighted estimation, as is the pseudo-/?2 
soon to be discussed. Weighted versus unweighted structural estimation yields the same qualitative results of interest. 
18
 A prediction is defined to be misclassified if either PROMOTE, = I and the model's predicted probability of 
promotion is less than 1/2 or PROMOTE/ = 0 and the model's predicted probability of promotion is greater than or equal 
to 1/2. As noted in Amemiya (1981), this criterion is appropriate when one has an "all-or-nothing" loss function, which 
applies the same penalty to a prediction of .49 as to 0 when the actual observation involves PROMOTE/ = 1. 
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TABLE 3 Estimates from Structural Tournament Model 
5 (wage spread) 
Worker characteristics 
Male 
More than high school 
College or more 
Age (divided by 10) 
Tenure (in years) 
Fraction high skilled 
Firm Characteristics 
Internal job postings 
For profit 
Number of sites (1000s) 
Establishment size (1000s) 
Union (fraction of workers covered) 
Performance of typical employee, /fa 
Industry controls 
Occupation controls 
Constant 
7-
.59 r 
(.326) 
-.026 
(.021) 
.014 
(.016) 
.026 
(.028) 
-.001 
(.010) 
.135" 
(.059) 
-.016 
(.043) 
— 
-
-
-
-
— 
-
-
.588" 
(.083) 
-
.023 
(.017) 
-.002 
(.015) 
.037 
(.024) 
.017" 
(.008) 
- . 1 8 8 " 
(.023) 
.130" 
(.025) 
-.006 
(.014) 
.024 
(.023) 
-.014 
(.013) 
- . 0 1 7 " 
(.006) 
.082" 
(.022) 
— 
YES 
YES 
.212" 
(.060) 
.075 
(.060) 
.145" 
(.039) 
-.090* 
(.052) 
- . 1 8 0 " 
(.088) 
.249" 
(.065) 
.009" 
(.001) 
-
-.078 
(.430) 
-.173 
(.430) 
.282 
(.430) 
.076 
(.430) 
-1.145' 
(.435) 
.044 
(.431) 
.192 
(1.192) 
-.006 
(1.193) 
.965" 
(1.192) 
-.046 
(1.192) 
.351 
(1.194) 
1.496' 
(.517) 
YES 
YES 
-.008 
(.541) 
Note: Estimation is by maximum likelihood. Sampling weights are used. Asymptotic standard 
errors are in parentheses. * and " denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. Sample size is 632 "skilled" workers. 
is typically a model that includes only a constant on the right-hand side. I define the benchmark 
model as one in which the three equations for worker performance, the spread, and promotions 
each include only constants, so that only three constants and six free covariance parameters are 
estimated. The resulting pseudo-/?2 is .90. Taken collectively, I interpret the evidence here as 
indicating a reasonably good fit of the model. 
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Recall that the tournament model has the following implications for the parameter estimates: 
Testable Proposition 1. ct\ > 0. 
Testable Propositions 2 and 3. a\2 < 0. 
Testable Proposition 4. ys > 0. 
As revealed in Table 3, all three parameters have the theoretically predicted signs and are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, providing empirical support for the tournament model. 
That is, a, = .591 (Z = 1.81), a,2 = -.090 (Z = 1.72), and y3 = 1.496 (Z = 2.89).19 The result 
that y-} > 0 implies that relative performance matters for the promotion of skilled workers, just as 
was found in Section 4 for the entire cross section. While that result alone is suggestive of internal 
promotion competitions determined by relative performance, the further findings that ai > 0 
and CT12 < 0 suggest that, at least for skilled workers, such internal promotion competitions are 
consistent with the notion of a tournament in which employers strategically choose the spread to 
induce effort and larger spreads induce higher levels of performance. 
The basic logic behind the tournament model's prediction that CT12 < 0 is that factors that 
depress incentives (and therefore performance) cause the firm to counter by increasing the spread, 
thereby increasing effort and performance. An example of such a factor, as discussed earlier, is 
8j, the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance. The results indicate that 
the prediction holds for the unobserved determinants of performance and the spread, since the 
estimated o\2 is negative. This pattern of opposing effects also appears in the observed covariates, 
in that five of the six worker characteristics have opposite signs between the performance equation 
and the spread equation. While many of these are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, 
the overall pattern is noteworthy and supportive of the logic of the tournament model. The clearest 
and most precisely estimated example of these opposing effects is found in the tenure variable, 
which is positive in the performance equation and negative in the spread equation. 
Since a key feature of the model is that it accounts for the full set of disturbance correlations 
in performance, the spread, and promotions, it is worth noting that a likelihood ratio test strongly 
rejects the joint restriction o\2 = a\v = a2v = 0; the test statistic is 46.5 and the critical value of 
the x2 distribution with 3 degrees of freedom is 11.34. It is also interesting to note that if this 
joint restriction is imposed, the theoretical prediction ot\ > 0 is no longer supported in the data; 
that is.ai = -.030 (Z = 1.63). The prediction y3 > 0 still holds, with y3 = .984 (Z = 1.68). The 
reason the prediction ai > 0 is lost in this model is that by imposing o\2 = 0 we are mistakenly 
treating the endogenous wage spread as exogenous in the performance equation, yielding a biased 
estimate of ot\. The results here suggest that, at least in the MCSUI, failure to treat the spread 
as endogenous would have led to quite misleading results with regard to the incentive effects of 
tournaments. 
DeVaro and Brookshire (2007) document a new empirical result that promotions are less 
likely in nonprofits than for-profits. Their proposed explanation is that workers in nonprofits expe-
rience intrinsic motivation deriving from their sympathy with the organizational mission, thereby 
allowing nonprofit employers to rely on promotions more to achieve efficient job assignments 
and less to create incentives via tournaments, whereas for-profit employers rely more heavily on 
promotion tournaments to create incentives. This theory implies that if nonprofit organizations 
are dropped from the estimation sample, the empirical support for the tournament model that is 
found in Table 3 should strengthen even further. That is exactly what happens. Dropping the 81 
nonprofits and estimating the structural model on 551 for-profits yields the following estimates: 
a = 0.709 (Z = 1.98), an = -0.118 (Z = 1.75), y3 = 1.633 (Z = 2.85), whereas the results in 
Table 3 were a = 0.591 (Z = 1.81), an = -0.091 (Z = 1.72), y3 = 1.496 (Z = 2.89). 
• Predicting the impact of change in the production environment. Recall that 0, denotes 
19
 These estimates account for the survey sampling weights as indicated by the likelihood function of the previous 
section. Results based on unweighted estimation are also supportive of all three predictions of the model; these are 
<*i = 1 . 1 2 2 ( Z = 2.08),CT,2 = -.152 (Z= 1.90), and yj = 1.031 (Z = 2.07). 
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TABLE 4 
Prior value of <TI„» 
.01 
.5 
1 
AS* ($) 
3.84 
5.57 
8.23 
AP 
-4 .9 
-7.1 
-10.5 
the variance in the stochastic component of worker performance for observation i. Let f{6) be the 
distribution of 6 in the population of establishments, where fie andae denote the mean and variance 
of 6. Given some auxiliary assumptions, it is possible to quantify the effect of an environmental 
change that shifts the distribution of 0, to the right, increasing both its mean and variance (that 
is, A/Z0 > 0 and Aag > 0), on the expected values of worker performance and the optimal wage 
spread.20 Let Q-, be distributed lognormal, and let fi\nS and o\„e denote the mean and variance of 
ln#;. Assume that fi\„e = 0 and that the structural disturbances for P and S* reflect only 0,, in 
the following fashion: ei, = r In 0, and en = <p In 0,, where the sign restrictions r < 0 and <p > 0 
are implied by the first-order conditions of the tournament model. Letting AS* and AP denote 
the implied changes in the expected values of the spread and performance, it is straightforward 
to show that AS* = cpAfte > 0 and that AP = [T + ot\(p]Ane, where r = -<p(ou/o22)l/2- The 
sign of AP is ambiguous in general and depends on the relative magnitudes of o\\, 022. and a\. 
Given the estimates in Table 3, however, it is clear that AP < 0. 
Attaching empirical magnitudes to AS* and AP requires choosing a magnitude for A fie and 
also assigning a value to o\„e prior to the environmental change. (Given the lognormal assumption, 
an increase in a\„s increases both fig and oe.) I consider an increase in o\ne that increases fie by 
one standard deviation of 0,, given the particular prior value of o\„g. Assigning a prior value of 
crinfl implies values for cp,T, and A/ie, and therefore AS* and A P.21 Since the prior value of a\„e 
on which these computations are based must be arbitrarily assigned, I compute AS* and AP for 
a range of possible values of a\n6. The results for three such values of o\n6 are shown in Table 4. 
Relative to the sample means of S* and P ($2.67 per hour and 77.7, respectively), these 
magnitudes are quite substantial, which is perhaps not surprising in response to an environmental 
change that increases the mean of 0 by a full standard deviation and also raises its variance. One 
should also consider that the assumptions underlying this example attribute all of the residual 
variance in the P and S* equations to variation in 9. While 0 is clearly an important factor in the 
disturbances £\ and s2, it is not the only factor. Thus, the responses depicted in Table 4 are likely 
to be somewhat overstated. 
7. Extensions and limitations 
• The results in Table 3 are robust to various changes in the specification of controls, including 
using the more detailed industry controls, using multiple race dummies, including quadratics in 
worker age and tenure with the firm, controlling for the age of the establishment either linearly 
or using three dummies (less than 2 years of operation, between 2 and 5 years, greater than 5 
years), and including dummies for whether the establishment employs any temporary workers 
and whether the establishment employs any contract workers. Across all such specifications, the 
results of interest are of comparable magnitudes; while their standard errors are in some cases 
higher than in the results I report, for the three parameters of interest, statistical significance is 
always achieved on a one-tailed test at the 10% significance level. I now discuss five potential 
concerns. 
20
 In principle, the effect on the expected value of promotion could also be analyzed, though this would depend on 
the structure of the hierarchy in the establishment, and this is not directly observed in the data. 
21
 The implied value of Afin is exp[(ain« + A<7|no)/2] — exp[<7|ns/2]. In this expression, the value of Aai„o is 
found by solving for A<rlntf as a function of <T|no in the equation A/i« = (CTH)I/2 or, in its less compact form, exp[(<T|ne + 
Aow)/2] - exp[0T|nfl/2] = Iexp((7in„){exp(CTinS) - 1}] I /2 . 
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First, the difference in hourly wages might be too crude a proxy for the relevant theoretical 
notion of the spread that actually motivates workers. The relevant spread is the expected difference 
in the present discounted value of total compensation between the two jobs, where the term 
"total compensation" is broadly defined to include the value of fringe benefits and all other 
nonpecuniary job characteristics. While the model accounts for classical linear measurement 
error in the spread, other functional forms for measurement error in the spread have not been 
addressed and could potentially contaminate the results. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
magnitude of measurement error in the wage spread appears fairly modest, given the distributional 
assumptions and the assumption on the functional form of this measurement error. Measurement 
error accounts for less than 6% of the total variance in the spread. That is, am/(a22 + am) = 
.009/(.145 + .009) = .058.22 
Second, the tournament model predicts that performance is an increasing function of wage 
spreads rather than wage levels, although wage levels affect a worker's participation decision as 
to whether to work for the firm (see footnote 3). That is, an increase in the spread, holding the 
wage level constant, induces higher performance. This suggests that a test of the effect of the 
spread on performance necessitates controlling for wage levels. In fact, the wage level does not 
appear on the right-hand side of the performance equation (3). By estimating the structural model 
only on an occupational subgroup (albeit a fairly broad one), I roughly control for wage levels by 
considering a relatively homogeneous group of workers with respect to skill level. Nevertheless, I 
estimated the model including a measure of wage levels (in particular the average of the pre- and 
post-promotion wages) on the right-hand side of the performance equation. The results are quite 
similar in magnitude to those in Table 3 and remain significant at the 10% level using one-tailed 
tests: a, = .531(Z= 1.37), an = -.086 (Z = 1.43), and y3 = 1.504 (Z = 2.93). 
A third potential concern is the possibility of measurement error in the performance ratings, 
arising because managers are likely to have imperfect information about the true performance of 
an individual worker, particularly when the worker is a recent hire. While such errors are likely 
in the performance measures for the most recent hire, they should be much less of a problem in 
the performance ratings of the "typical worker" in the same position. This latter rating draws on 
the manager's experience with many workers that have been employed in the position over time, 
including some who have been observed in the position for a long time. I therefore extended the 
structural model to account for measurement error in P, dropping the measurement error in the 
wage spread to simplify the estimation. All three predictions of the model are upheld and are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. That is, a, = .618 (Z = 24.69), ai2 = -.105 (Z = 4.21), 
and Y3 = -993 (Z = 1.75). An alternative source of measurement error in performance might 
arise because performance is rated by a different respondent (at a different establishment) for 
each observation, creating a respondent-specific effect in measuring both performance ratings. 
For example, it might be that upbeat or optimistic managers provide higher-than-true assessments 
of performance, both for the most recent hire and for the typical worker in that position. Hence, 
both P and PQ could be measured with error, and these errors would be correlated. To account 
for this, I extended the structural model to account for a common measurement error (interpreted 
as a respondent-specific effect) in both P and P0, dropping the measurement error in the wage 
spread to simplify the estimation. The theoretical predictions ai > 0 and o\2 < 0 are upheld in 
this version of the model, and both are statistically significant. That is, a\ = .616 (Z = 26.37) and 
CT12 = -.105 (Z = 4.26). The prediction y3 > 0 is unsupported, with y3 = -.181 (Z = .54). The 
likely reason this prediction is unsupported is that incorporating measurement error in P0 implies 
a strong restriction on y3. placing an upper bound on y3 that is decreasing in the variance of the 
measurement error. In the Appendix I discuss both extensions of the structural model in more 
detail. 
A fourth potential concern is the validity of the exclusion restrictions used to identify the per-
formance equation. The model assumes that firm characteristics are absent from the performance 
22
 The estimates for (T22 and am appear small in magnitude relative to the mean value of the spread reported in 
Table 1 ($2.83 per hour) because I have scaled the spread, dividing it by ten when estimating the structural model. 
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equation. This could be problematic if workers perform differently in different types of firms. 
Another rationale for including firm characteristics in the performance equation is the possibility 
of a respondent-specific effect. If certain types of respondent managers work in certain types of 
firms, then this provides a rationale for including firm characteristics in the performance equation. 
I can address these concerns to some extent by partially relaxing this identifying assumption, 
since identification requires only that a single firm characteristic be absent from the performance 
equation rather than all firm characteristics. I therefore estimate the model including all firm 
characteristics in the performance equation except for "union," or the percent of the workforce 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The union variable is probably the closest item 
available in the MCSUI to an "exogenous" factor affecting the spread. While it could still be 
argued that unions might have a direct effect on effort, meaning this variable should also be 
included in the performance equation, the effects of unions on the wage structure are clear and 
well documented, suggesting that the presence of the union variable in the equation for the spread 
is of first-order importance. It is hoped that any direct effects of unions on effort are small by 
comparison. The three key results all hold in this version of the model and remain statistically 
significant at the 10% level, with a, = .702 (Z = 1.74), a,2 = -.107 (Z = 1.85), and y3 = 1.533 
(Z = 2.95). This provides some assurance that the absence of all firm characteristics from the 
performance equation is not driving the results. 
Finally, there is considerable heterogeneity on both the worker and firm sides in the cross 
section of worker-establishment observations. I attempt to cope with this to the extent permitted 
by the data through control variables and through selection of a worker subsample that is roughly 
homogeneous with respect to skill but large enough to generate interesting results. Nonetheless, 
unmeasured heterogeneity could affect the results. In particular, tournaments might look very 
different in some job types as compared with others in the estimation sample. To some extent this 
can be addressed by re-estimating the model on a series of subsamples, each of which drops an 
individual narrowly defined occupation that represents a relatively small fraction of the "total" 
estimation sample used in the main analysis. In such tests I found that the three results of interest 
were largely unchanged. 
8. Conclusion 
• I have presented evidence that promotions are determined by relative performance in a cross 
section of workers spanning multiple establishments. Using a structural model, I have also shown 
that promotions in a subsample of skilled workers are consistent with three propositions from 
tournament theory: (i) worker effort is increasing in the wage spread attached to promotions, 
(ii) worker effort is decreasing in the stochastic component of performance, whereas the wage 
spread is increasing in this stochastic component, and (iii) promotions are determined by relative 
performance. A main objective of this analysis has been to illustrate the value of recognizing 
the behavior of both principal and agent simultaneously when constructing empirical models for 
confronting theory in personnel economics with data. The fashion in the empirical literature has 
been to estimate descriptive regressions focusing on only one set of behaviors at a time, either 
the worker's or the firm's. For example, studies that test for incentive effects of tournaments treat 
the spread as exogenous in a single equation for performance. Such an approach would have 
led to quite misleading results in the present context. While estimation of the structural model 
yielded evidence that tournaments have incentive effects in that performance is increasing in the 
spread, this result would have been missed by taking the standard approach of estimating a single 
performance equation with an exogenous spread. Furthermore, the finding that the unobserved 
determinants of performance and the spread are negatively correlated was possible only because 
the structural model treated this correlation as a free parameter to be estimated. Increased attention 
to empirical models that simultaneously incorporate the behaviors of all economic agents appears 
to be a promising direction for future research in empirical personnel economics. 
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Appendix 
• Incorporating measurement errors in worker performance. 
Case 1: measurement error in P. Suppressing the subscript i that indexes observations, suppose that the performance of 
the most recent hire is measured with error, so that P = P* + $, where P denotes observed performance, P' denotes true 
performance, and $ represents a mean-zero reporting error that is uncorrected with the structural disturbances £|, £2. and 
£3. This reporting error could reflect both imperfect information and respondent-specific qualities such as optimism. For 
simplicity, I assume that the wage spread is measured without error, yielding the following structural system: 
P' =a0 + ot\S + Xct2 + e] (Al) 
S = A) + F/J, + X/?2 + £2 (A2) 
P = P* + ? (A3) 
T" = YO + Fy, + Xy2 + y, P0 + £3 (A4) 
[1 if /* > 0 
PROMOTE = I ~ (A5) 
I 0 if/* < 0. 
where/* = P* - T*. 
Substituting (Al) into (A3) and substituting (Al), (A2), and (A4) into the expression for /*, we can rewrite the 
system as 
P' = a0 + ct]S + Xa2 + £1 
S = /% + Ffii + X/J2 + £2 
P = a 0 + o(|5 + Xa2 + tA 
/* = X0 + FX, + XX2 + A.3P0 + v 
1 if /* > 0 
PROMOTE = , 
10 if/* < 0, 
where t/f = e\ +$ , X0 = ao +c*i fk> - Yo, Xi = on/?, - y{, k2 = a\P2 +<*2 - J^.Vi = -yj.and v = £, +a |£ 2 - £3. 
I assume (£1, £2, \jr, v) ~ MVN(0, £) and constrain v to have unit variance for identification. Six parameters in £ are 
identified: an orcov(£,, f),a\2otco\(E2, f),o\v orcov(^fr, V),CT,^ or on+ o re{. CT22. and CT2„. The likelihood function has 
the same form as that expressed in the text, but with different expressions for g\ and go. Defining K = Xo+FX 1+XX2+X3 Po. 
the expression for g\ is now as follows: 
g\ = g(P, S I PROMOTE = 1) x Pmb(PROMOTE = 1) 
/
OO T O O 
/ S(«l.£2. ^, v)dvd£i X J 
ocJ~K 
/ o o /•oo 
/ g(v, £, I £2, V0«(£2. ^)dvde\ x J 
/
oo /»oc 
/ g(v, £, I s2,\j/)dvd^odel x J. 
00 J - K 
where the Jacobian of transformation from (£1, £2. lA. ") to (P*, S, P, /*) , is 1. The expression forgo is analogous. 
Case 2: measurement error in both P and Po- Now suppose that both performance ratings are measured with a common 
error, so that P = P* + f and Po = P0* + £, where the measurement error has mean zero and is uncorrelated with the 
structural disturbances £1, £2, and £3. The error in this case has a natural interpretation as a respondent-specific effect, 
which could arise if some managers are optimistic and tend to inflate performance ratings, whereas others are pessimistic 
and rate too harshly. For simplicity, I assume that the wage spread is measured without error, yielding the following 
structural system: 
(A6) 
(A7) 
(A8) 
(A9) 
(A 10) 
(Al l ) ( u 11 / < u, 
where/* = P* - T*. 
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The reduced-form expression for /* is as follows: 
/* = A.o + FX| + XX2 + A3 P0 + v. 
where k0 = £*o + <*i A> - YO.^t = ot\fi\ - Y\ , X2 = <*i/?2 + <*2 - Yl- *3 = - t t . a n d " = S| +«if2 - «3 + ftH-
I assume (61,82. y .S) ~ MVN(0, X) and constrain v to have unit variance for identification. Six covariance 
parameters are identified: o\ \, CT22, ay „, <r2l,, CTI 2, and <Xf J . The likelihood function has the same form as that expressed in 
the text, but with different expressions for g 1 and go. Defining K = A.0 + FX1 + XX2 +A.3P0. the expression for g\ is now 
as follows: 
g\ = g(P, S I PROMOTE = 1) x Prob(PROMOTE = 1) 
/
OCi /*OC fOC /-00 
/ g(e\,E^,v,H)dvde^y.^= \ g(? )g(e,, e2) / «(" I £1. «2. ?)dvrfe, x J, 
00 J-K J-aa J-K 
where J is the Jacobian of transformation from (£|, e2, v, ? )to(P*, S, /*, P),and where the expression for go is analogous. 
There is a key difference between this model and both the one in the main body of the text and in Case 1 of this 
Appendix. All three models are similar in structure. The main model of the text has a single measurement error rj in the 
wage spread, the model in Case 1 of this Appendix has a single measurement error ? in the worker performance rating, 
and the present model has a single measurement error f in both worker performance ratings. The key difference lies in 
v, the disturbance for the reduced-form expression for /*. In the present context, the measurement error <• appears in the 
expression for v, since v = e\ +a |£ 2 — E^ + y^, whereas in the other two models there is no measurement error term in v. 
Thus, in the present context we have cov( v, £) = n Var(f), meaning that ft appears in the disturbance covariance matrix E. 
The presence of ft in 2 implies a strong restriction on this parameter. Positive definiteness of E requires that a number of 
inequalities involving ft hold, including the following inequality: ft < l/VVaKf). To see this, consider an arrangement 
of L such that its first two rows and columns pertain to v and f. Positive definiteness of Z requires that all leading principal 
minors be positive. Requiring that the second of these minors be positive implies Var(£) — [ftVar(%)]2 > 0. Rearranging 
this expression yields ft < l/\/Var(f). In the limit, as the variance of measurement error becomes large, this inequality 
approaches ft < 0, whereas tournament theory implies ft > 0. Hence, in the limit the model cannot deliver the result 
that relative performance matters in determining promotions. A finding of ft > 0 is compatible with only very modest 
amounts of measurement error in PQ . This is an unfortunate by-product of assuming measurement error in PQ , and the 
problem exists even if there is no measurement error in P. The constraint on yj arises only as a consequence of the need 
to ensure that the statistical model makes sense (in that it has a positive definite covariance matrix) and not from the 
economics of the problem. 
References 
AMEMIYA, T. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey." Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 19 (1981), pp. 1483-1536. 
AUDAS, R., BARMBY, T, AND TREBLE, J. "Luck, Effort, and Reward in an Organizational Hierarchy." Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 22 (2004), 379-395. 
BAKER, G.P., GIBBS, M., AND HOLMSTROM, B. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (1994a), pp. 881-919. 
-• - , , AND . "The Wage Policy of a Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (1994b), pp. 
921-955. 
, JENSEN, M.C., AND MURPHY, K.J. "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory." Journal of Finance, Vol. 
43 (1988), pp. 593-616. 
BECKER, B. AND HUSELID, M. "The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation Systems." Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1992), pp. 336-350. 
BELZIL, C. AND BOONANNO, M. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives." Working Paper, Tempe University, 
2005. 
BOGNANNO, M.L. "Corporate Tournaments." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 19 (2001), pp. 290-315. 
BULL, C , SCHOTTER, A., AND WEIGELT, K. "Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study." Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 95 (1987), pp. 1-33. 
CARMICHAEL, H.L. "The Agent-Agents Problem: Payment by Relative Output." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 1 
(1983), pp. 50-65. 
CHAN, W. "External Recruitment Versus Internal Promotion." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 14 (1996), pp. 555-570. 
DEVARO, J. "Strategic Promotion Tournaments and Worker Performance." Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 27 (2006), 
pp.721-740. 
AND BROOKSHIRE, D. "Promotions and Incentives in Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizations." Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 60 (2007), pp. 311-339. 
AND WALDMAN, M. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence." Working Paper, 
Cornell University, 2005. 
EHRENBERG, R.G. AND BOGNANNO, M.L. "The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European 
PGA Tour." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43 (1990a), pp. 74S-88S. 
C RAND 2006. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
542 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
AND . "Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?" Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (1990b), pp. 
1307-1324. 
ERIKSSON, T. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data." Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 17 (1999), pp. 262-280. 
GIBBONS, R. AND WALDMAN, M. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 114 (1999), pp. 1321-1358. 
AND . "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms." Journal of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 24 (2006), pp. 59-107. 
GIBBS, M. "Testing Tournaments? An Appraisal of the Theory and Evidence." Labor Law Journal, Vol. 45 (1994), pp. 
493-500. 
GREEN, J.R. AND STOKEY, N.L. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91 
(1983), pp. 349-364. 
HOLMSTROM, B. "Moral Hazard in Teams." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13 (1982), pp. 324-340. 
HOLZER, H. What Employers Want: Job Prospects for Less-Educated Workers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996. 
KNOEBER, C.R. AND THURMAN, W.N. "Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production." 
Journal ofLabor Economics, Vol. 12(1994),pp. 155-179. 
LAMBERT, R.A., LARCKER, D.F., AND WEIGELT, K. "The Structure of Organizational Incentives." Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 38 (1993), pp. 438-161. 
LAZEAR, E.P. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97 (1989), pp. 561-580. 
. "The Job as a Concept." In W. Bruns, ed., Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1992. 
AND ROSEN, S. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 
(1981),pp. 841-864. 
LEVY, A. AND VUKINA, T "The League Composition Effect in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Players: An Empirical 
Analysis of Broiler Contracts." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 22 (2004), pp. 353-377. 
MAIN, B., O'REILLY, C , AND WADE, J. "Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?" Journal of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 11 (1993), pp. 606-628. 
MALCOMSON, J.M. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 92 
(1984), pp. 486-507. 
MCCUE, K. "Promotions and Wage Growth." Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 14 (1996), pp. 175-209. 
MCFADDEN, D. "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior." In P. Zarembka, ed., Frontiers in Econo-
metrics. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
MCLAUGHLIN, K. "Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey." In R. Ehrenberg, ed.. Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 
9. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI, 1988. 
MOOKHERJEE, D. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (1984), pp. 
433-146. 
NALEBUFF, B.J. AND STIGLITZ, J.E. "Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition." 
Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 14 (1983), pp. 2 1 ^ 3 . 
O'KEEFFE, M., VISCUSI, K., AND ZECKHAUSER, R.J. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes." Journal of 
Labor Economics, Vol. 2 (1984), pp. 27-56. 
O'REILLY, C.A., MAIN, B.G., AND CRYSTAL, G.S. "CEO Compensation as Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale of 
Two Theories." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1988), pp. 257-274. 
PRENDERGAST, C. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (1999), pp. 7-63. 
ROSEN, S. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13 (1982), pp. 311-323. 
. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments "American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (1986), pp. 701-716. 
WALDMAN, M. "Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion." Economic Inquiry, 
Vol.41 (2003), pp. 27-41. 
. "Job Assignments, Signalling and Efficiency." RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1984), pp. 255-270. 
ZABOJNIK, J. AND BERNHARDT, D. "Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-Wage Rela-
tion." Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 68 (2001), pp. 693-716. 
© RAND 2006. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
